Investigative Classics is a weekly feature on noteworthy past examples of the reporting craft.
Much journalism is just a raw collection of facts. At a higher level, it suggests an understanding that deserves the label “first draft of history.” But every once in a while, the insights are so perceptive that the reporting arguably rises to the level of prophecy.
Such was the case with David Halberstam’s Pulitzer Prize-winning work from Vietnam in 1963 -- work that so infuriated President John F. Kennedy that he tried to get the New York Times publisher to replace Halberstam (JFK was assassinated in November of that year).
Halberstam is shown at left above in Vietnam, with his co-Pulitzer winner Malcolm Browne of the Associated Press and Neil Sheehan of United Press International. The two would both follow Halberstam to the Times, where Sheehan in 1971 would break the story of the Pentagon Papers, the secret history of the war.
In 1963, though, Halberstam alone of the three had New York Times front page as primary megaphone. There he painted a dire picture of the war effort as the U.S. embarked upon a massive commitment of blood and treasure in Southeast Asia – raising troop levels from 16,000 to 184,300 by 1965. In a dispatch dated Dec. 23, he informed readers:
The long and bitter struggle to keep South Vietnam from being taken over by Communism has reached a critical point.
For a year there the war has been going poorly for the anti-Communists, and the tough, well-armed Communist guerrillas are stepping up the conflict. Facing them is a new and uncertain military Government. The Communist guerrillas, known as the Vietcong, hold the initiative, militarily and psychologically, in most rural areas. ...
The resources to turn back the Vietcong are available, these observers say, but what is in doubt is the nation’s willingness to pay the price for victory. …
A prolonged trip through the lush delta these days is a sad journey for someone who also traveled there more than a year ago. Those earlier trips took place in an area where the Government had a good chance at victory. Now the signs of Government neglect and the Vietcong’s presence are everywhere. There are district capitals where Government troops do not move from their posts and where they face the night uneasily. There are villages, formerly Government-controlled, where children look away when Government troops arrive. There are Government airstrips where light planes land through Vietcong sniper fire. In one village and American officer and a newsman found a Vietcong flag flying from the roof of a small Roman Catholic Church. The officer asked the young priest to explain.
“It is very simple captain,” the priest said. “You and the government come here once every three or four months and you have tea with me and then you leave. But the Vietcong are here every night and this is the price they exact for the survival of my church. They are very clever, I think.”
As he reported on possible responses, Halberstam was transformed into Cassandra, issuing unheeded warnings.
The outlook is that the situation will deteriorate unless the Government can wrest the initiative from the guerillas … [or the] use of US troops to prop up the government. …
The use of United States troops for combat, rather than for advisory, support and training missions would pose major problems. Some think that nothing would please the Communist world more than the sight of American troops fighting the Vietcong.
Furthermore, many guerrilla-war experts believe that the Vietnamese rice paddies would swallow up the United States troops, that the population would turn on them and help the Vietcong … .
